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Abstract
Neural activity causally underlies human cognition and behavior. Investigating the neu-
robiological principles and computational mechanisms governing brain activity during
decision-making provides a way to improve theories of human behavior in the natural
as well as social sciences (Glimcher & Rustichini 2004; Rustichini, 2009; Fehr & Rangel,
2009). In this context, the discipline of Neuroeconomics was originally conceived as an
endeavor to interrogate neural activity during economic decision-making with the aim
of evaluating competing decision theories (Rustichini, 2008; Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr
& Poldrack 2009). From this origin, Neuroeconomics has evolved into a full-fledged
enterprise of consilience; an attempt to not only test and bridge, but truly unify natural
science and social science explanations of human behavior (Wilson, 1998; Glimcher &
Rustichini, 2004; Rangel, Camerer & Montague, 2008).
This dissertation binds two neuroeconomic studies of decision-making with an in-
troduction and concluding commentary. The introduction presents a brief introduction
to Neuroeconomics, meant to locate both research studies in the existing literature and
philosophy of this field. The conclusion provides a brief appraisal of the role of Neu-
roeconomics in further advancing the kind of research into decision-making reported
here.
Both studies in this dissertation comprise investigations of human behavior dur-
ing experience-based decision-making, with a special focus on the fundamental value
computations that underlie such choice behavior.
Study 1 investigates the role of neural reinforcement signals during learning of a
strategic decision task from experience.
Study 2 investigates the moderating effect of intelligence on neural reinforcement
signals during a sequential binary choice task.
Study 1 is reproduced from (Hawes, Vostroknutov & Rustichini 2013), and study 2
is reproduced from (Hawes, DeYoung, Gray & Rustichini; under review).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Neuroeconomic studies apply the formalism and conceptual structure of mathematical
game theory and computational neuroscience to psychological, economic and neurolog-
ical representations of human behavior. The experimental toolkit of Neuroeconomics
draws upon the entire breadth of current neuroimaging techniques, such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging, electroencephalography, magnetic encephalography, and
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Fehr & Rangel, 2011, Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004).
Unlike traditional economic models, which typically constitute ”as if ” descriptions
of human behavior, neuroeconomic models aim at ”as is” representations of human
decision-making1 . This means that traditional economic models aim to describe hu-
man choices in terms of mathematical equilibria among the constraints and incentives
of a decision situation, without presuming that decision-makers necessarily perform
the exact computations which mathematically identify these equilibria (Bernoulli ,1954;
Savage, 1954; Koopmans, 1960; Houthakker, 1950; Samuelson, 1938).
In comparison, neuroeconomic models aim at structural description of the deci-
sion process itself; i.e. at describing the neurobiological mechanisms underlying basic
value computation (e.g. Plassman,ODoherty & Rangel, 2007), value comparison (e.g.
Christopoulus, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan & Schultz 2009), and outcome evaluation dur-
ing simple choices (e.g. San Martin et al, 2010). At the level of theory, Neuroeconomics
1 In this comparison the term traditional economics is limited to descriptive microeconomics, be-
cause it is the branch of economics to which Neuroeconomics can be most usefully compared. In this
dissertation we do not consider a relation to normative micreconomics, or macroeconomics (normative
or descriptive).
1
2additionally aims to provide an organizing framework for how these fundamental value
computations link to higher-level behaviors and choice (Dickhaut, Rustichini, Smith,
2009; Krajbich, Camerer, Ledyard & Rangel, 2009). This is what makes Neuroeco-
nomics similar to traditional economics, which similarly provides a formal framework
for mapping prespecified utility to complex behaviors (Bernoulli, 1954), and what dif-
ferentiates Neuroeconomics from Social Cognitive Neuroscience more generally.
The research presented in this dissertation is neuroeconomic in content, method and
philosophical approach. While each study stands by itself as an individual experimental
investigation of a narrowly defined research question, both studies are connected by
a common emphasis on linking fundamental value computations during experience-
based decision-making to individual differences in preferences and strategic choice. By
doing so, the work in this dissertation also represents an effort of integration between
economics and psychology; more specifically the psychology of personality.
Attempts of integrating psychology (and sociology) and economics have a long his-
tory in both disciplines (e.g. Simon 1956) and appear to be experiencing a recent re-
vival (Rustichini, DeYoung, Anderson & Burks, 2011; Ferguson, Heckman, Corr, 2011).
When considering efforts for integrating psychology and economics, it again makes sense
to distinguish between what I have above termed the traditional economic approach ver-
sus the neuroeconomic approach:
The traditional economic approach for integrating psychology into economics – at
times implicitly, at times explicitly – has chiefly been concerned with the finding that
the decision-makers objective reality (i.e. the one modeled by the economist) often
systematically deviates from the decision-makers subjective reality; presumably because
of psychological biases for what kind of information is attended to, or even how certain
types of information are interpreted in context (Strotz, 1955; Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Examples of such deviations are numerous,
and range from famous violations of expected utility theory during simple binary choice
(Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961) to prominent violations of pure self-interest in multi-person
decision situations (Loewenstein, Thompson & Bazerman, 1998; Thaler 1988; Henrich
et al, 2001). From an economic perspective, Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), Cummulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) theories of Bounded
Rationality (Simon, 1982; Gigerenzer 2002), and a body of Social Psychology research
3commonly labeled Behavioral Economics (see Ariely & Norton, 2007) can therefore all be
understood as attempts at replacing the traditional description of economic man - homo
economicus (Mill, 1836) - with alternative agent descriptions of greater psychological
validity2 (e.g. Gilboa, Schmeidler, 1989; Maccheroni, Marinacci & Rustichini, 2006).
More recent research related to the integration of economic decision theory and
personality theory from psychology has primarily focused on personality traits to
a) explain behavioral heterogeneity between actors (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman
& ter Weel, 2008; Almlund Duckworth, Heckman & Kautz, 2013, Denissen & Penke,
2008),
b) within-actor changes of revealed preferences and personality across tasks (e.g.
Roberts & Jackson, 2008 & Dingemanse, 2010), and
c) observed changes of actors over the life-span (personality as investment), (e.g.
Heckman, 2007; Cunha, Heckman & Schennach, 2010).
These attempts have been primarily motivated by the ability of psychological traits
to predict economic outcomes (e.g. Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi & Goldberg, 2007;
Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman & ter Weel, 2008; Coates, Gurnell & Rustichini, 2009),
and appear to be ushering in a shift away from the traditional economic actor - composed
of predefined parameters for risk sensitivity and attitude towards temporally delayed
rewards - towards a more complex actor definition comprising multiple parameters re-
flecting basic psychological traits (Rustichini, 2009).
In regards to integration with psychology, the neuroeconomic approach differs from
traditional economics mostly in terms of its level of analysis. Like traditional economics,
Neuroeconomics considers the pervasive role of psychological personality during deci-
sion making, and attempts to account for personality-based individual differences in
its description of the decision-maker (Rustichini, 2009). However, the neuroeconomic
revision of the two-dimensional decision maker appears to also entail a fractioning of
the decision-maker into multiple systems (e.g. Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure & Cohen
2006; van den Bos & McClure, 2013). Hence, instead of equipping the decision-maker
with a psychologically informed utility function (as would be the traditional approach,
2 From a psychological perspective this research is probably better understood as an attempt to
provide behaviorist psychology with a formal framework for mapping external context to behavior
(Prospect Theory and Bounded Rationality), or as providing formal notation for social psychological
theories (Behavioral Economics).
4Neuroeconomic research appears to be moving in the direction of describing the individ-
ual in terms of an emergent entity of (two or more?) potentially competing/potentially
cooperating systems; each with its own utility function and psychological properties3 .
The neurobiological system under consideration in this dissertation is referred to
as the persons dopaminergic reward system. It consists of the ventral tegmental area,
nucleus accumbens and connected parts of the prefrontal cortex. This reward system
has been identified as critical to various forms of reinforcement learning, which appears
to constitute a fundamental and pervasive process of how the brain assigns value to
choice alternatives from experience (Dayan & Daw, 2008). Activity in the dopaminer-
gic system during reinforcement learning and cognitive decision tasks have been linked
to individual differences in intelligence (Previc, 1999; Schlagenhauf et al, 2012). Intel-
ligence, or cognitive ability, occupies a special position in the description of economic
behavior: In various applied and experimental studies it has been demonstrated that
cognitive skills significantly affect important life-time outcomes such as health, divorce,
education, income, but also correlate with systematic differences in attitude to risk,
temporal delay, and strategic reasoning in competitive games (Shamosh & Gray, 2008;
Burks, Carpenter, Goette, Rustichini, 2009; Shamosh et al 2008). In other words, intel-
ligence links dimensions of decision-making (risk and discounting) traditionally thought
to be independent (Rustichini, 2009). Because this link extends beyond general improve-
ments of information processing along different phases of the decision process, and across
different domains of decision making (Burks, Carpenter, Goette, Rustichini, 2009), Neu-
roeconomics should be concerned with understanding these simultaneous correlations
between intelligence and preferences at the level of the decision makers fundamental
value computations4 . The studies presented below should be read with the above
context in mind, and viewed as inceptive contributions towards this greater theoretical
objective.
3 This kind of fractioning of the decision-maker is of course not unique to Neuroeconomics (see.
for example Fudenberg Levine, 2006 for a dual self model of self-control), but neuroeconomic investi-
gations of psychological personality appear more closely aligned with these kind of representations of
the decision-maker, than is the case for traditional models that consider personality. Philosophically,
the multiple-systems approach to decision making has strong roots in neuroscience and psychology (e.g.
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).
4 A more detailed discussion of the role of intelligence is included in study 2.
Chapter 2
Experience and Abstract
Reasoning in Learning Backward
Induction (Hawes, Vostroknutov
& Rustichini, 2012)
5
6Backward induction is a benchmark of game theoretic rationality, yet surprisingly
little is known as to how humans discover and initially learn to apply this abstract
solution concept in experimental settings. We use behavioral and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) data to study the way in which subjects playing in a sequen-
tial game of perfect information learn the optimal backward induction strategy for the
game. Experimental data from our two studies support two main findings:
First, subjects converge to a common process of recursive inference similar to the
backward induction procedure for solving the game. The process is recursive because
earlier insights and conclusions are used as inputs in later steps of the inference. This
process is matched by a similar pattern in brain activation, which also proceeds back-
ward, following the prediction error: brain activity initially codes the responses to losses
in final positions; in later trials this activity shifts to the starting position.
Second, the learning process is not exclusively cognitive, but instead combines ex-
perience based learning and abstract reasoning. Critical experiences leading to the
adoption of an improved solution strategy appear to be stimulated by brain activity in
the reward system. This indicates that the negative affect induced by initial failures
facilitates the switch to a different method of solving the problem. Abstract reasoning
is combined with this response, and is expressed by activation in the ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex. Differences in brain activation match differences in performance between
subjects who show different learning speeds.
2.1 Introduction
Backward induction (BI) is a recursive algorithm, wherein inferences regarding a deci-
sion problem made at an earlier stage are applied to the process of deriving yet further
inferences on the problem. As a mathematical construction, backward induction consti-
tutes a benchmark of game theoretic rationality that prescribes the behavior of rational
players in finite sequential games of perfect information. In game theory, the concept is
at the basis of abstract theorems; most notably Zermelo’s theorem (1908) on the exis-
tence of equilibria in pure strategies for those games, or Selten’s theorem (1967, 1974)
characterizing Sub-game perfect equilibria.
In contrast to its applicability in mathematical proofs, backward induction has at
7times been considered inapposite as a descriptive account of the cognitive processes
operating in human subjects during the sort of strategic interactions that game theorists
would conceptually represent as sequential games (Johnson, 2002). In part, backward
inductive reasoning has been considered an unlikely description of the human thought
process during such game situations, because it requires the cognitive enactment of a
solution concept that is considerably complex and ostensibly unnatural. However, we
find evidence that subjects playing the sequential game of perfect information in our
experiment have a common pattern of learning the optimal solution, and that although
individuals may differ in their speeds for producing this pattern, the path is common,
and reproduces the steps of the backward induction algorithm.
To argue effectively this conclusion, we first review what the backward induction
algorithm prescribes. We illustrate backward induction in finite sequential games of
perfect information. These are games in which players alternate in actions, know and
remember precisely the choices made by other players in previous stages of the game,
and know exactly the payoff structure for all players involved. A strategy for a player
is a rule assigning a move at every decision point. For these games, backward induction
prescribes the following procedure to construct a strategy for every player: At the very
last stage of the sequential game, when the final player makes the last choice of the
game, she should move to maximize her payoff from the choice made at this stage. We
can call this step the last stage. Since the game ends at the last stage, and because
payoffs are known, rationality prescribes the outcome of the last player’s choice. In other
words, all players, including the last player herself, can unambiguously determine what
would constitute the payoff maximizing choice given the options available at the last
stage. The second to last player should anticipate the unambiguous criteria according
to which the last player will choose, and conclude that his second to last choice will
ultimately yield the payoffs induced by the optimal move of the last player. After this
has been established, the original game is effectively replaced by a game with shorter
length where the last move is eliminated and the payoff at the last stage is defined to
be the payoff following the optimal choice of the last player. Iterating this process until
the initial decision point is reached produces a strategy for every player.
Backward inductive reasoning relies in an essential way on the human ability for re-
cursive thought, which itself has been posited as a prerequisite for quintessential human
8achievements such as language acquisition and basic numeracy (Hauser, 2002). Hence,
to the extent that this innate human ability to think recursively manifests itself in
strategic games, there may indeed exist a link between fundamental cognitive processes
in humans and the abstract game theoretic concept of backward induction. Following
this conjecture, we conduct two studies of a particular strategic social interaction that
facilitates recursive learning. These studies were designed to address two fundamental
questions: First, what are the neural correlates of recursive learning in the strategic
environment, and second, how do the cognitive processes involved in recursive learning
connect to abstract backward inductive reasoning.
2.2 Experimental Paradigm
2.2.1 Hit-N Game
The finite sequential game which subjects play in our experiment is played by two parties
on a virtual playing board, and is the same as used in (Gneezy, 2010). The board used
to display the game in the imaging study is presented in Figure 2.1.
9Figure 2.1: Board of positions for the game G(15, 3). This is the board of positions used
in the imaging experiment. The superimposed red rectangles indicate the losing positions 3, 7,
and 11. The green rectangles indicate the winning positions. In the lower section of the figure
two displays indicate the current score of the subject and the (computer) opponent.
For the basic variant of the Hit-N game used in this experiment, the first player to
move is allowed to move a single common playing piece on the board, and she is allowed
to move it only forward, by 1, 2, or 3 positions; no more or no less. The move then
goes to the second player, who is allowed the same action of moving the figure 1, 2, or 3
positions forward. From thereon the opportunity to move according to the 1-2-or-3-only
rule alternates between the two players. The player who reaches the final position (15
in experiment 1) first wins that game. We refer to this game as G(15, 3). A second
game in our experiment involves the game G(17, 4) which is played on a virtual playing
board of length 17, and allows players to move 1, 2, 3 or 4 positions forward.
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We apply backward induction reasoning to this game to derive the optimal strategy:
Players moving in position 12, 13 or 14 can win by reaching position 15 immediately.
It follows that players moving at 11 have lost, since they can only move to 12, 13 or 14,
where the opponent, as we have just seen, wins. Players can now replace the original
game with the shorter game where the first player to reach position 11 wins: a move is
optimal in the original game if and only if it is optimal in the reduced game. The same
argument, repeated, shows that the player who first gets to position 7 wins; after which
it can be concluded that the first to reach 3 wins. In summary, all positions different
from 3, 7 and 11 are winning positions, because from there the player who is moving
can reach either position 3, 7 or 11, and win: she just has to be sure to move there. On
the other hand, positions 3, 7 and 11 are losing positions, and there is not much that
the player moving there can do but hope for an error of the opponent. The argument
we have just presented is the BI solution to G(15, 3). A similar argument shows that
the losing positions in G(17, 4) are {2},{7}, {12}, and the groups of winning positions
are {1}, {3, 4, 5, 6}, {8, 9, 10, 11}, {13, 14, 15, 16}.
The Behavioral study
We use data from (Gneezy, 2010) as a behavioral sample, and focus here on error rate,
response time, and their relation. A total of 72 subjects competed in 20 trials of G(15, 3),
and 52 out of the 72 subjects played an additional 10 trials of G(17, 4). The incentive
structure for G(15, 3) promised $5 for winning more than 5 trials over the 20 game
period, and $20 for winning more than 11 trials. For G(17, 4) subjects were promised
$10 for winning more than 5 games.
2.2.2 The fMRI study
A total of 12 subjects participated in the MRI study. They played first 20 trials of
G(15, 3), then 20 trials of G(17, 4) against a computer. The game, incentives and
instructions include three modifications to those used in the behavioral study. First,
subjects are informed that they are playing a computer, programmed to win and subject
to small errors. Also subjects play 20 trials of G(17, 4) (compared to 10 trials in study
1). Finally subjects were allowed 10 seconds to make a choice on each of their turns.
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Data were collected at the Center for Magnetic Resonance Research (CMRR) at
University of Minnesota using a 3T Siemens Trio scanner. Both studies were approved
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Minnesota. Subjects in
both studies signed an informed consent form after they were given the instructions.
2.3 Model
To motivate the need for a theoretical model and the structure we are going to use, we
begin by considering the relation between two key observable variables, response time
and error rate. The response time is the length of the time interval between the moment
in which the move of the opponent (another player or the computer) is observed and the
moment in which the subject makes his next move. To define the error rate, we focus
on G(15, 3) and note that at every winning position one, and only one, of the possible
moves is correct, and the other two are incorrect. An error is the choice of the wrong
move, and the error rate is the frequency of this event, conditional on the position being
a winning position for the subject (these are the only positions at which an error is
possible). The correct response rate is the difference from 1 of the error rate.
How are these two variables related? It may be reasonable to assume that, everything
else being equal, a longer response time is associated with a higher correct response rate.
This for example would be the case if the response time were varied exogenously, since
by thinking about the problem for a longer time the subject would be more likely to
achieve a richer understanding of what constitutes a good move. We point out that the
condition of everything else being equal is crucial for this assertion. Considering now,
that the length of the response time is not exogenous, but is decided upon by the subject
who is reasoning about the decision, the relationship between response time and error
rate may, however, be a different; indeed reversed: Since the reasoning activity can be
assumed - in some measure - costly, a decision maker may compare and trade-off the
estimated returns and costs from the reasoning activity. If the returns are estimated to
be low, he may prefer to discontinue the process. If they are high, he might continue.
Consider also, ability as an individual characteristic: An individual with lower cognitive
skills may find the returns to his reasoning unsatisfactory, stop early, and be more likely
to make the wrong choice. Similarly, a subject who has not acquired a basic familiarity
12
with the game may conclude very little from his examination, stop cognitively engaging,
and commit errors at a high rate. Both cognitive ability and problem familiarity are
subsumed under the concept of ability. Considering response time as a choice variable
together with differences in ability, the average relation at the individual level between
response time and correct response rate may therefore be negative. In our data we find
this to be the case. Figure 2.2 illustrates this point.
Figure 2.2: Average response Time and Average Correct Rate. The averages are
computed for each subject over the trials for the G(15, 3) (on the left) and G(17, 4) on the right.
The simple regression in Table 2.1 of the correct response rate on the individual
average response time confirms the negative relation, again in both games.
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Table 2.1: Average response Time and Average Correct Rate OLS for both
games
Error15 Error17
b/se b/se
Avg. Correct G(15, 3) –8.581***
(1.766)
Avg. Correct G(17,4) –8.633***
(1.797)
Constant 10.993*** 11.010***
(0.952) (1.017)
r2 0.252 0.316
N 72 52
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Given the observed relation it appears particularly prudent that we consider a model
in which response time is endogenously determined, and that reflects the notion that
subjects choose to think about a problem, decide whether to stop thinking, and only
then select a move.
2.3.1 Optimal Information processing
In our experiment, at each turn, a player observes the position in the game, considers
a set of potential cues and insights, and tries to identify the best move at the current
position. At any point in time before choosing a move, he can terminate the process and
then make a move determined by the conclusions reached up to this point. If he does
not terminate the process, he has to decide the intensity of the effort devoted to the
decision. The quality of his decision will then depend on his ability to reason about the
game as well as his effort in doing so. We consider ability as an individual characteristic
of the player, and this may describe both a player’s natural, general skills, as well as
her acquired understanding of the game. We also consider effort as a choice variable.
Ultimately, both effort and ability contribute positively to the agent’s problem solving
success.
We model the above process as an optimal information acquisition problem to be
solved in the time interval before the move. In the model, the subject has to choose an
action, and has beliefs over which of the feasible actions (for example, the set {1, 2, 3}
in G(15, 3)) in currently the best. In every instant during this process the agent can
observe an informative signal on what the best action is, update her belief, and decide
whether to continue the information acquisition process or to stop and choose what at
the current belief is the optimal action. The model outlined above constitutes a general
inter-temporal decision problem which can be formulated as a dynamic programming
problem with an action set that consists of the agent’s effort and the decision to continue
or stop processing information about the game. The state space of the problem is the
set of beliefs over the action set, assigning to each action the probability that it is the
best action. Information acquired in every instant is a partially informative signal on
the true state; that is, on which among the feasible actions is the optimal one.
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2.3.2 Model Predictions
It is clear that if ability is so low that any processed signal is entirely non-informative,
the optimal time spent should be zero, and that correct response rates in this case
will consequently be low. This is likely to occur in the early stages of the game, when
subjects are just beginning to familiarize with the task, and lack even the basic insights
to make even minor headway into the problem. At this stage we should observe a short
response time and a high error rate. The effect should also be more pronounced at
the difficult positions, those further from the end: this is because reasoning about the
best move can only produce useful insights when the individual has some idea of what
happens in later stages of the game, at positions closer to the end. In the initial rounds
this understanding of the game at later stages is lacking, and the subject may prefer to
discontinue the reasoning soon because it is not producing any useful insights.
At the opposite extreme, if ability is so large that the signal is completely informa-
tive, only a short time will be necessary while still leading to a high correct response
rate. This is likely to occur of course at the late stages of the game, when a subject has
an overall understanding of the optimal strategy. It is also likely to occur at the final
positions, where very simple reasoning can provide the conclusion.
Between these two extremes, where signal is partly informative, the optimal policy
will prescribe a positive response time. Overall the relation between ability and response
time is non-monotonic: likely to be increasing for low values of ability, and decreasing
for higher values.
A specific conclusion of the model is that the response time at a position is not neces-
sarily monotonically increasing or decreasing with experience, but might instead be first
increasing and then decreasing. At the early stages, low experience, which corresponds
to low ability, induces an early stopping of the reasoning process (the information acqui-
sition in our model), a short response time and a high error rate. At intermediate stages,
as the subject acquires some basic understanding of the game, reasoning becomes more
informative, hence stopping is postponed. Finally, in later periods the response time
declines as subjects simply implement a solution algorithm which they now understand.
We will see that subjects’ behavior broadly matches these predictions, and provide
the conceptual framework for the analysis of the imaging data.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Behavioral Results
We review the basic behavioral results presented in (Gneezy, 2010) to prepare for the
analysis of the imaging data. To analyze error rate, we define a subject’s error j as a
subject’s failure to move the marker to j, whenever this is possible and moving to j is
part of the winning strategy. In G(15, 3) the possible errors of interest are failures to
move the marker to any of the positions 3, 7, 11 or 15 whenever this would be possible.
The error rate at j, ej , is the fraction of times the error is made over the times the
subject could avoid the error. For example e3 is calculated as the number of times the
subject had the opportunity of moving her opponent to position 3, yet failed to do so,
divided by the times the subject held the move at position 1 or 2 in the game. The
average error rate is the number of errors made at a winning position divided by the
number of times the subject was in a winning position.
Response times for subjects show a marked decline across trials: see Figure 2.3,
with subjects requiring more than 8 seconds on average to make a choice during the
first three periods of the game, but not even half of that during the last 3 periods.
There is a substantial difference in the evolution of the Response Time in the two
games. Consider first the Game G(15, 3). Note that the first trial has a very special
role, since it is the one where subjects get acquainted with the task, and the rules of
the game. If we ignore the first trial we see that the response time increases from the
second to the fourth trial, and then declines, as the model predicts.
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Figure 2.3: Response time. Average Response time across trials in G(15, 3) and G(17, 4).
The plot shows an unexpectedly long response time for the very first trial, which is driven by
subjects’ response time at the initial onset of the game (see also figure 7). At the onset of
the game subjects appear to require additional time to familiarize themselves with the game
environment. Removing the initial position of the initial round produces an increase in response
time for G(15, 3) in line with model predictions.
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For the first trial of G(15, 3) the error rate is 0.38, which is significantly lower than
the average error rate that would be expected if choices were made randomly. Across 20
trials of study 1, the error rate steadily declines until it almost reaches zero: see Figure
2.4.
Figure 2.4: Error rate by Period. Average error by type for G(15, 3).
The four possible errors in G(15, 3) occur at significantly different rates. No subject
deviates from the winning strategy choice at the final 3 positions (e15 = 0). Error
rates and average period marking the last occurence of a particular error are lower for
positions closer to the game’s end (e3 ≥ e7 ≥ e11): see Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Last Trial for Error. Whisker plot of trial during which the last error occurred;
separated by type.
Each of the differences between e3, e7, and e11 is statistically significant (p < 0.01),
and the pattern suggests that subjects indeed learn to identify losing positions in a
sequential manner that begins from the game’s final positions. These observations indi-
cate that subjects progress through a sequence of minor realizations towards becoming
proficient in the Hit game. The above trends for G(15, 3) replicate in G(17, 4). For both
games we observe lower error rates at later positions, and an overall decrease of error
rates over repeated trials. Average response times decline across trials in both games.
Subjects make significantly fewer mistakes in G(17, 4) than in G(15, 3) indicating
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that subjects transfer some of their acquired skill to the new game. Observing however,
that only 20 out of 72 subjects manage to commit zero errors in G(17, 4), it is likely,
that most subjects have not fully developed the explicit BI solution to the sequential
game after 20 trials of G(15, 3).
Figure 2.6 illustrates the average response time in the losing positions, for each of
the periods.
Figure 2.6: Response Times in losing positions, G(15, 3). For each of the 20 periods in
which the game G(15, 3) was played we report the average response time at each of the losing
positions, 3, 7, and 11.
For position 11, the losing position which is closest to the end, the highest response
time occurs in the first period, and declines in the periods thereafter. The peak for
position 7 is reached at period 4, and that for position 3 is reached at period 5. As
the model predicts, the response time is non monotonic over the periods. For example
the response time in period 7 is low at the initial stages, when subjects typically have
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a limited understanding of the game, but increases as the insight that the position 11
is a losing position is acquired and becomes available in the analysis of what to do at
position 7. In later periods the response time at position 7 declines.
A similar relation can be seen in Figure 2.7, which illustrates the average response
time at winning positions for G(15, 3).
Figure 2.7: Response Times in winning positions. As in the previous Figure 2.6 we report
for each of the 20 periods in which the game G(15, 3) was played the average response time at
each of the four winning positions groups.
In this case too, the peak for the middle positions (winning positions {4, 5, 6} and
{8, 9, 10} is reached after an initial low value. The peak is reached at period 4 for
{4, 5, 6} and at period 3 for {8, 9, 10}. The response time at the very first positions
{1, 2} increases slowly; the maximum is reached at period 8, after an initial spike in
period 1 which is likely to be due to the fact that the very first instance of position 1
is also the subjects’ very first encounter with the game. The response time at the easy
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positions {12, 13, 14} monotonically declines after the initial period.
The figures we have seen present instructive average values over individuals’ response
times. A more accurate description is provided by the panel data regressions in Table
2.2 for G(15, 3) game and Table 2.3 G(17, 4) for which the dependent variable is the
response time and the time variable for the panel is the index of the period. The
independent variables are dummy variables corresponding to the groups of positions.
They are indexed in increasing order according to their position on the board, left to
right. For example, the first group of winning positions (Win Pos 1) in game G(15, 3)
indicates the set of positions {1, 2}. The second group of losing positions for G(17, 4)
indicates the position 7. In both regressions the variable dropped is the final group
of winning positions, that is {10, 11, 12} for G(15, 3) and {13, 14, 15, 16} for G(17, 4).
Table 2.2: Response time in G(15, 3): Panel Data analysis
RT151 RT152 RT153
b/se b/se b/se
Win Pos 1 1.472*** 1.293*** 1.299***
(0.447) (0.432) (0.432)
Win Pos 2 2.979*** 2.690*** 2.679***
(0.446) (0.432) (0.432)
Win Pos 3 3.095*** 3.009*** 3.005***
(0.456) (0.442) (0.442)
Losing Pos 1 4.223*** 4.820*** 4.849***
(0.499) (0.484) (0.484)
Losing Pos 2 6.726*** 6.946*** 6.969***
(0.474) (0.459) (0.459)
Losing Pos 3 1.280*** 1.299*** 1.306***
(0.466) (0.451) (0.451)
period –0.381*** –0.561***
(0.021) (0.088)
period square 0.009**
(0.004)
Constant 3.800*** 7.801*** 8.460***
(0.396) (0.447) (0.544)
r2
N 5044 5044 5044
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Table 2.3: Response time in G(17, 4): Panel Data analysis
RT171 RT172 RT173
b/se b/se b/se
Win Pos 1 2.972*** 2.957*** 2.958***
(0.920) (0.886) (0.874)
Win Pos 2 3.307*** 3.140*** 3.066***
(0.904) (0.870) (0.859)
Win Pos 3 2.711*** 2.653*** 2.637***
(0.913) (0.879) (0.868)
Losing Pos 1 2.866*** 3.327*** 3.420***
(0.984) (0.948) (0.936)
Losing Pos 2 4.078*** 4.205*** 4.262***
(0.943) (0.908) (0.896)
Losing Pos 3 0.802 0.773 0.774
(0.926) (0.891) (0.880)
period –0.964*** –3.110***
(0.091) (0.359)
period square 0.204***
(0.033)
Constant 3.866*** 8.429*** 12.565***
(0.694) (0.797) (1.033)
r2
N 1442 1442 1442
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The constant value is similar in both games, and around 4s. The main effect of
learning the game is estimated by the variables period and period2, indicating a signifi-
cant and fast (particularly in the game G(17, 4)) decline over time. The other variables
confirm what we have seen in the aggregate analysis of the figures. Most notably, the
increase in response time at losing positions is significantly higher than the one induced
by winning positions; making more likely the conjecture that subjects carry over into
the analysis of positions further from the end, insights they have obtained from the
losing position 11, and possibly search for equivalent insight among positions earlier in
the game.
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2.4.2 The fMRI data
Expected activation patterns and regions of interest
On the basis of the model and the analysis of the behavioral data we can formulate
hypotheses to be tested in the study of the imaging data.
Learning of the method of backward induction should begin with the negative af-
fective response experienced with moving at position 11, and realizing that the game is
lost at that point. This experience should involve the reward system, particularly the
Striatum (Schultz, 1997). We explore this hypothesis in section 2.4.3.
The predicted striatal response should be stronger, and occur earlier with subjects
for whom behavioral evidence indicates that they posses a better understanding of the
optimal strategy. We explore this hypothesis in section 2.4.4.
Further, the analysis of behavioral data has shown longer response times at the
losing positions of game G(15, 3). The brain activation at these three positions should
be similar, but should occur at different points in time during the experimental session.
Brain activation should involve both areas associated with reward system and areas
involved in abstract reasoning. We test this hypothesis in section2.4.5 (see in particular
in figure 2.11).
One of our main assertions is, that the affective response induced by the understand-
ing that the game is lost at position 11 should occur together with activation of frontal
areas involved in planning, particularly VLPFC (Crescentini, 2011). This hypothesis is
also examined in section 2.4.5
In what follows we present results obtained from an event-related random effects
general linear model (rfxGLM) with 16 predictors. Predictors are dummy variables
indicating the 7 sets of positions for G(15, 3) over the first 10 trials (Early) and the
last 10 trials (Late). A dummy variable indicating the computer’s turn, and a constant
term complete the model. The omitted variable corresponds to a resting period between
trials. Unless explicitly stated, all results reported here are significant at an uncorrected
threshold of p ≤ 0.005 ; t(12) ≥ 3.49 for the full sample, or with t(5) ≥ 4.77 when split
into Fast and Slow Learners. Fast Learners are defined as the 6 subjects with the lowest
average error rate over both games. These are incidentally also the 6 subjects with
the most wins in G(15, 3). Correspondingly, Slow Learners are the 6 subjects with the
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highest average error rates.
The model and observed behavior suggests that subjects become proficient at the
Hit-15 game via a sequence of insights pertaining to their experience at losing positions;
the generic manifestation of which is the avoidance of the losing position at 11, followed
by avoidance of position 7, and for some subjects avoidance of position 3. These adap-
tations, which are likely accompanied by (conscious) realization of these positions as
losing positions happen at dramatically varying rates between subjects, and have crit-
ical relation to models of prediction error processing and temporal difference learning
(see e.g. (Schultz, 1997), or (Daw, 2010). According to models of prediction error-based
learning, unexpected occurrences of losing positions should be accompanied by corre-
sponding BOLD signal change in areas involved with prediction error (PE) tracking,
such as the Striatum (Schultz, 1997) and Insula (Preuschoff, 2008). We expect to see
these PE responses whenever subjects first realize that a given position is a losing posi-
tion, and also when subjects are unexpectedly placed onto an already identified losing
position; both of which necessitate a yet incomplete understanding of the game, when
played against a reasonably proficient opponent such as the computer program used for
this study. This expectation follows, because prediction error responses should become
less pronounced as subjects gain greater insight into the game as a consequence of their
increased ability to accurately predict the games outcome. Hence, once the game’s
losing positions have been identified, finding oneself at a subsequent losing position be-
comes almost perfectly predictable at earlier stages, wherefore prediction errors should
eventually approach zero.
2.4.3 Prediction error response in the Striatum and Insula
All subjects in the fMRI sample learn to identify position 11 as a losing position at some
point during the game. In agreement with the idea that the identification of position
11 as a losing position induces an activation in the reward system, we find significant
differences in striatal activation for subjects considering a move at losing position 11
compared to when considering a move at winning position {1, 2}. The difference in
activation is in the direction of a negative prediction error, and an illustration is pro-
vided in Figure 2.8. (See also Supplementary Material for time course graphs of BOLD
activation)
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Figure 2.8: Brain activity at the losing position 11 in G(15, 3). Contrast obtained from
a GLM with 16 predictors on all 12 subjects. In the GLM we use the same 7 groupings for
positions in the game, and differentiate between positions during the first (early) and last (late)
10 trials, for a total of 14 predictors. An additional predictor for computer choices and a constant
term describe the full model. The contrast used in the figure shows activation when the current
position is 11 during both early and late trials compared to activation at positions {1, 2} during
early and late trials. The map shows activation at a false discovery rate q < 0.05.
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Figure 2.8 also shows significant positive activation of the left and right Insula at
coordinates (41, 19, 3), as subjects perceive the near inevitability of losing the game at
position 11. This activation is consistent with the Insula’s involvement in processing
negative affect, and it’s role in signaling negative prediction errors (Seymour, 2004)
2.4.4 Prediction error response for Fast Learners
Given our main interest in the neural signature of the sequential, recursive way in which
subjects learn the solution to the Hit-N game, we concentrate in Figure 2.9 on the Fast
Learners; those subjects who actually manage to quickly reduce the amount of errors
they make in the game.
Figure 2.9: Progression of activation at losing position 11 for Fast learners. GLM
and contrasts as for figure 2.8, but limited to Fast Learners.
The left panel of Figure 2.9 contrasts activation at position 11 to activation at
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position {1, 2} for Fast Learners. Consistent with the role of the Striatum in signalling
prediction errors, we find that subjects show a strong initial negative response in the
Striatum at losing position 11 during the first 10 rounds, which diminishes or disappears
during the last 10 rounds. Panel C in Figure 2.10 shows that this change of Striatal
activity for Fast Learners is statistically significant at an uncorrected threshold of p ≤
0.005, (t(5) ≥ 4.77). At the same threshold, we observe significant activity in the Insula
during both time periods.
Our analysis also shows strong activity in the Insula at position 7 compared to
{1, 2} during early trials, and eventually activity in the Striatum at position 7 during
late trials; indicating a shift of the prediction error from position 11 to position 7; the
sequence - as we have already shown - in which subjects learn the losing positions.
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Figure 2.10: Progression of activation in Fast and Slow learners. Panel A: Contrast
obtained from a GLM with 16 predictors on 6 subjects classified as Slow Learners. The depicted
contrast shows activation at position 11 compared to activation at position 1,2 during late
trials. p < 0.005 uncorrected, t > 4.77. Panel B: Same model as panel A. The depicted
image subtracts the contrast obtained for positions 11 vs {1, 2} in late periods from the contrast
obtained for those positions during early periods. Positive identification of Striatum in this
contrast, is driven by a more strongly negative activation at position 11 in late periods for Slow
learning subject. Panel C: 12 predictor GLM for 6 subjects classified as Fast Learners. As
in panel B, we show the subtraction of the contrast (11early-1,2early) - (11late-1,2). We find
activation in Medial Prefrontal Gyrus (MPFG), VLPFC and Striatum. Negative identification
in Striatum is driven by a more strongly negative response at position 11 during early trials for
Fast Learners. p < 0.005 uncorrected for all images depicted here.
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Figure 2.10 provides support to the above observations by overlaying the contrasts
of early and late activity at position 11 (compared to {1, 2}) for both Fast and Slow
learners. Slow learners exhibit detectable striatal activation in direction of a prediction
error only during the last 10 trials; consistent with the observation that these subjects
learn the game according to the same general pattern, but at a slower pace, than subjects
classified as Fast Learners. However, the direct test of the effects of Early/Late periods,
Fast/Slow learners, and the interaction term of these classifications, shown in table 2.4,
did not identify a statistically significant effect for the interaction (p=0.158).
Table 2.4: Interaction between Fast/Slow learner, and Early/Late trial on
BOLD signal contrast position 11 - position {1, 2} in Striatum.
Perc. BOLD
b/se
Dummy for Fast Learners -0.09366
(0.08354)
Dummy for First 10 Periods 0.15197
(0.32534)
Interaction Term 0.17345
(0.11814)
Constant 1.02843***
(0.23005)
r2 0.2144
N 24
2.4.5 Experience-based learning and abstract reasoning
The center image of panel C in Figure 2.10 identifies a cluster of voxels in the ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) (47, 40, 3) with strong positive activation during the
early losing position for Fast Learners. In what follows, we investigate the activity in
this area when subjects are in losing positions for the game G(15, 3).
32
Figure 2.11: Fast learners at the losing positions. Contrast for Fast Learners during first
10 periods at p < 0.005. The contrasts used are for each of the three losing position, compared
to the predictor given by the game being in position {1, 2}. For example the contrast for the
position 3 indicates the comparison between position 3 and position {1, 2}. The top panel
shows the clusters in VLPFC activated for the different contrasts. The lower panel shows the
activation for the contrasts (3, {1, 2}), (7, {1, 2}) and (11, {1, 2}). Activation in VLPFC is not
found in Fast Learners during the last 10 rounds, and Slow Learners show it only during the
last 10 rounds for 11-{1, 2}. Note, from Figure 2.5 that the Fast Learners do not make mistakes
past round 10, while Slow Learners commit mistakes even at position e11 past round 10. It
should be noted here that a direct test of the interaction between subjects’ categorization as
Fast/Slow Learner and a dummy variable indicating Early/Late trials did not yield a statistically
significant effect (p=0.158 two-sided, see table 4). We believe that the failure to identify such
an effect at conventional significant level in our data may be due to small sample size, and an
insufficiently precise measure of when subjects learn the game.
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Our analysis of losing positions, illustrated in Figure 2.11, shows statistically signif-
icant increases of activation in the VLPFC at all of the losing positions during G(15, 3).
Given this region’s association with tasks requiring spatial imagery in deductive reason-
ing (see (Knauff, 2002) or (Crescentini, 2011)) the observation of higher activity during
losing positions is of particular interest, as it indicates the special contribution that the
experience of a losing position seems to make towards subject’s progress in learning the
game.
Figure 2.11 shows overlapping regions of activation for all losing positions experi-
enced by Fast Learners that is most pronounced at position 11, and least pronounced
at position 3; once again highlighting the critical nature of the initial losing position 11
for subject’s learning experience with the game.
2.5 Conclusions
We have explored how subjects learn to play the Hit-N game, and how this process
converges for all subjects to learning the optimal strategy with the method of backward
induction. We found strong evidence for a sequential learning process in which sub-
jects learn the losing positions at the game’s end first. We showed that the behavioral
characteristics (in error rate and response time) of this sequential learning process are
consistent with a basic search model in which subjects choose an optimal search effort
conditional on their ability and associated search costs.
We have also shown a neural pattern of activation in the brain’s reward system,
including the Insula and Striatum, that mirrors the behaviorally implied pattern of
subjects learning to identify losing positions from the game’s end. In particular, we find
that the rate at which subjects learn to identify losing positions is also reflected by a
differential onset of prediction error response between Fast and Slow Learners. A critical
finding of our study is the implication of the prefrontal cortex in subject’s progression
towards finding the solution to the Hit-N game. Here we find that activity in VLPFC
is higher at losing positions than at corresponding winning positions. Taken together,
these findings point towards a cognitive process in which the affective experience of a
losing position feeds critically into the subject’s abstract cognitive engagement with the
task.
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While most of our discussion concentrated on subject’s success in recursively learning
to identify losing positions in the Hit-N game, it is clear that such a process - although
enabling subjects to master any length Hit-N game - is not equivalent to an abstract,
explicit understanding of the BI solution to the game; one which could be transferred
instantaneously to other similar games, such as G(17, 4). We see then, in both of our
studies, that most subjects, despite quickly becoming highly proficient in G(15, 3),fail to
instantaneously achieve proficiency in G(17, 4). Instead, subjects require an abbreviated
learning period also for the second game. What seems remarkable about the transition
of behavior from G(15, 3) to G(17, 4) is that subjects, even without ostensibly having
explicit knowledge of the BI solution at the time they beginG(17, 4), nonetheless commit
fewer errors, and require a shorter learning phase for the theoretically more difficult
second game. This observation provides strong indication that the recursive learning
algorithm that enables learning of G(15, 3) is also a contributor to the development
of a precursory understanding of the game’s abstract solution. One implication of this
finding is that complex cognitive insights, such as understanding that bckward inductive
reasoning provides a solution to the general Hit-N game, can arise from the interaction
of experience-based reward system responses and abstract reasoning within a relatively
simple model. The fact that an experience-based understanding derived from playing
G(15, 3) is effective in improving subject’s performance in G(17, 4) suggests that at
least some higher-order cognition and insights might be motivated and prepared by
joint activity in the brain’s reward system and prefrontal cortex.
2.6 Method and Materials
2.6.1 MRI data acquisition
High resolution anatomical images were acquired first, using a Siemens t1-weighted 3d
flash 1mm sequence. Then, functional images were acquired using echo planar imaging
with Repetition Time (TR) 2000ms, Echo Time (TE) 23ms, flip angle 90 degrees, 64×64
matrix, 38 slices per scan, axial slices 3mm thick with no gap. The voxel size was 3×3×3
mm.
The data were then preprocessed and analyzed using Brain Voyager QX 2.1. The
anatomical images were transformed into Talaraich space in 2 steps: first the cerebrum
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was rotated into anterior commissure - posterior commissure (AC-PC) plane using tri-
linear transformation, second we identified 8 reference points (AC, PC, and 6 boundary
points) to fit the cerebrum into the Talaraich template using trilinear transformation.
We preprocessed functional data by performing slice scan time correction, 3D move-
ment correction relative to the first volume using trilinear estimation and interpolation,
removal of linear trend together with low frequency non-linear trends using a high-pass
filter. Next, we co-registered functional with anatomical data to obtain Talaraich refer-
enced voxel time courses, to which we applied spatial smoothing using a Gaussian filter
of 7 mm.
2.6.2 GLM models
fMRI analysis was performed in BrainVoyagerQX version 2.1. Contrasts obtained for
G(15, 3) are based on the results of an event-related general linear model with random
effects using 16 predictors. 7 predictors signify the period in which a subject contem-
plates any of the positions {1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7}, {8, 9, 10}, {11}, {12, 13, 14} during
the first 10 trials of G(15, 3). Another 7 predictors signify the same position during the
last 10 trials. An additional predictor for times in which the computer is moving and
an intercept term describe the model. Contrasts obtained for G(17, 4) are based on the
results of an event-related general linear model with random effects using 16 predictors.
7 predictors signify the period in which a subject contemplates any of the positions
{1}, {2}, {3, 4, 5, 6}, {7}, {9, 10, 11}, {12}, {13, 14, 15, 16} during the first 10 trials of
G(17, 4) . Another 7 predictors signify the same position during the last 10 trials. An
additional predictor for times in which the computer is moving and an intercept term
describe the model.
2.6.3 Fast and Slow Learners
The fMRI study consists of 12 subjects. For analysis comparing Fast and Slow Learners
in G(15, 3), subjects were split into groups according to their overall error rate (a subject
is slow if the error rate is larger than 40 per cent), which also constitutes a splitting
according to Wins in G(15, 3) (a subject is slow if the number of wins in that game is
less than five). Both are median values, but they are also values at which there is a
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large change of performance.
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Chapter 3
Intelligence Moderates Neural
Responses to Monetary Gains
and Losses (Hawes, DeYoung,
Gray & Rustichini, Under
Review )
The nature of the relation between cognitive skills and economic preferences is a key
question in psychology and economics. Examining subject’s intelligence (IQ) and re-
sponses to probabilistic feedback during a simple decision task allows us to investigate
neural correlates of cognitive ability at the foundational level of gain/loss processing.
Our neuroimaging results for 94 subjects show that typical declines in striatal BOLD sig-
nal after monetary punishment are significantly less pronounced for subjects with higher
IQ. This finding strongly implicates IQ in the ex-post processing of decision outcomes,
thereby opening up the hitherto unconsidered possibility that cognitive mechanisms un-
derlying outcome evaluation may be central to how intelligence influences preferences
and decision, especially attitudes towards risk. We further investigate the role of IQ
for outcome evaluation on subject’s behavior on our decision task to demonstrate a
correlation between IQ and the extent to which past decision outcomes influence future
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choices. Specifically we find that larger IQ predicts behavior to be more strongly corre-
lated with an extended period of previously experienced decision outcomes, while lower
IQ predicts behavior to be correlated exclusively to the most recent decision outcomes.
In addition to showing the moderating effect of intelligence on neural responses to gains
and losses, our findings illustrate the existence of a link between intelligence and choice
behavior that extends beyond the ex-ante comparison of decision options to include
ex-post evaluation of decision outcomes. Importantly, this identified link suggests that
observed correlations between intelligence and preferences may be rooted in a unitary
process of how decision outcomes are experienced.
3.1 Introduction
The ability to maintain and manipulate mental models of the environment - including
abstract representations of the relationships between actions and outcomes, and the
contingencies on which they depend - is critical to most instances of learning, planning,
and goal directed decision-making (Johnson-Laird, 2010; Li, Delgado, & Phelps, 2011;
Solway & Botvinick, 2012). During experience-based decision making, humans rely on
mental models not only during the process of making a choice, but also while evaluat-
ing feedback and interpreting newly observed relations between actions and outcomes
following that choice (Hampton, Bossaerts, & ODoherty, 2006; Rangel, Camerer, &
Montague, 2008; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Liljeholm & ODoherty, 2012; Daw, Ger-
shman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011). Stable systematic differences in the mental
models that decision makers entertain may therefore have a two-fold influence on deci-
sion making. First, a direct influence on which actions and action-outcome contingencies
are considered and compared during a choice task; and second, a more indirect influence
on the evaluation of histories of observed rewards following decisions: Identical histories
of feedback will be experienced differently by evaluating decision makers if they evaluate
it using different mental models. This difference in experience is likely, eventually, to
affect behavior, especially during trial-and-error decision making. In addition, domain
general stable influences of mental models on feedback evaluation and the experience of
decision outcomes are likely to eventually manifest in stable differences in preferences.
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Furthermore, cognitive defaults applied to such domains (e.g., attitudes toward uncer-
tainty and temporal delay) may be influenced by how persons with different cognitive
models of these outcomes experience the resolution of uncertainty, or the delivery of a
delayed reward.
One likely source of systematic individual differences in mental models is intelligence,
which has been described as the cognitive ability to manage complexity (Gottfredson,
1997). Links between model complexity and intelligence could help to explain why
standard measures of IQ predict systematic differences in decision-making, including
variation in preferences for risk and temporally delayed rewards (Dohmen, Falk, Huff-
man, & Sunde, 2010; Shamosh & Gray, 2008; Shamosh et al., 2008; Rustichini, 2009).
In particular, higher intelligence has been associated with reduced aversion to beneficial
risk taking, as well as to reduced discounting of delayed rewards (Dohmen et al., 2010;
Rustichini, 2009; Burks, J, Goette, & Rustichini, 2009; Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro,
2012). Because greater intelligence is likely to be associated with the ability to maintain
mental models of increasing complexity, one possible explanation for the correlation of
intelligence with the two theoretically separate domains of decision making (risk and
temporal delay) may be rooted in systematic differences in how subjects with different
levels of intelligence experience probabilistic rewards. Thus, an important necessary
first step towards fully identifying the role of intelligence for preferences and decision
making is to identify the extent to which intelligence relates to ex-post evaluation of de-
cision outcomes. At the foundational level this entails investigating the relation between
intelligence and randomly obtained monetary gains and losses.
In this research we establish a link between IQ and monetary gain/loss processing by
evaluating subjects’ behavior and neural responses during a simple decision task, very
similar to a previously examined paradigm used by Delgado et al (Delgado, Nystrom &
Fissel; 2000). In our decision task, participants guessed whether a computer-generated
number would be high or low, and received monetary gains and punishments depending
on the correctness of these guesses. By experimentally manipulating subjects’ perfor-
mance on this task to be pseudorandom and fixed, our task design eliminated the op-
portunity for subjects to experience different performance histories, and thus minimized
any potential concern that between-subject variance in choice behavior was driven by
differences in the history of obtained rewards. Instead, remaining individual differences
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in responses to gains and losses during our task are restricted to intrinsic differences in
preferences for reward/punishment, or to individual differences in how the experience
of reward/punishment is interpreted in relation to the decision-task.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
We collected data from 100, male, right handed-subjects. Subjects were administered
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999), which provides
an estimate of full-scale IQ using 4 sub-tests (Vocabulary, Similarities, Block Design,
and Matrix Reasoning). Average IQ was 122.9 (min: 95.5, max: 148.0, SD: 11.6).
Subjects further completed a battery of questionnaires and cognitive tasks that included
an n-back working memory task. During the working memory task, subjects viewed a
series of words and indicated whether each word matched the one appearing three
previously. Correct and incorrect responses were then combined into an indicator of
working memory. Median age for our subjects was 22 (min: 18, max: 38). Data for
6 subjects were discarded because of excessive head-motion in the scanner, leaving 94
participants in our analysis.
3.2.2 fMRI Procedures
Subjects performed the experimental tasks reported here, and three additional unrelated
tasks for a scanning time of 1.25 hours. Imaging data were collected using a 3-Tesla
Siemens Trio scanner at the Yale Magnetic Resonance Research Center. For each partic-
ipant, a high-resolution T 1-weighted anatomical image (MPRAGE, time repetition[TR]
= 2500 ms; time echo [TE] = 3.34 ms; inversion time = 1100 ms; flip angle = 7o; slices =
256, voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1mm) and 180 contiguous functional volumes (gradient-echo
EPI sequence; TR = 2000ms; TE = 25ms; field of view [FOV] = 240cm; flip angle =
80o; voxel size = 3.75 × 3.75 × 4 mm ) were acquired. Participants viewed stimuli
projected onto a screen through a mirror mounted on the head coil. Responses were
made using fiber-optic response buttons, using the fingers of the right hand. Stimuli
were presented in PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993).
43
3.2.3 Stimuli and Design
Subjects were instructed to guess whether an upcoming computer generated number
would be either Low (in the set {1,2,3}) or High ({4,5,6}). Subjects were rewarded with
$ 1 (USD) for each correct guess, and received a punishment of $ -1 for each incorrect
guess. The guessing game was interspersed with 20 reward-neutral control trials, during
which subjects were also instructed to press a button, but for which they received neither
feedback, nor monetary rewards/punishments. During the guessing game, subjects saw
a sequence of stimuli as shown in figure 1. During reward-relevant trials, subjects first
saw a 1 dollar bill displayed on the screen for 3 seconds. During this time subjects
indicated their guess regarding the upcoming number. After these 3 seconds, subjects
first saw a computer generated number for 1 second, and then, depending on trial type,
a green upward arrow, or a red downward arrow containing the words you win or you
lose for another 1 second. Control trials started with a 3 second display of a gray
rectangle of the same size as the dollar bill, followed by an asterisk for 1 second, and a
blue rectangle containing the word same for another 1 second.
Unbeknownst to subjects, the computer’s number generating process was fixed so as
to confront each subject with the exact same pseudo-randomized sequence of outcomes,
irrespective of the subjects choice behavior (i.e., a high or low number was selected on
each trial based on the fixed sequence and the subject’s guess). Hence, each subject
saw the same sequence of gain and loss trials (20 gains and 20 losses in total) in the
same order, interspersed with 20 reward-neutral control trials during which no outcome
was revealed. All trials were separated by fixation periods of 3, 5 or 7 seconds duration
(jittered). The task design is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Task design: Subjects engaged in 40 reward relevant trials. At the beginning
of these trials a US dollar bill was displayed for 3 seconds, during which subjects pressed one
of two buttons indicating their guess of whether a computer generated number would be Low
(1-3) or High (4-6). Guesses were followed by two feedback screens, each 1 second in duration.
Reward relevant trials were interspersed with 20 reward-neutral trials, which were signaled by a
gray rectangle. In this figure (but not in the task itself), a green outline marks the sequence of
screens seen during gain trials. A red outline marks the sequence of screens for loss trials, and
grey marks reward neutral control trials. Correct/incorrect outcomes were rewarded/punished
with $ US+/-1.
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3.2.4 fMRI Data Analysis
All data were preprocessed and analyzed using BrainVoyager QX 2.1 (Brain Innovation,
Maastricht, The Netherlands). T1-weighted anatomical images were transformed into
Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) by manually identifying the anterior
and posterior commissure and then applying BrainVoyager default settings for spatial
normalization. Functional data were preprocessed by applying slice time correction
(using cubic spline interpolation), alignment of slices (using cubic spline interpolation
to the first non-discarded scan time within a scan run), motion correction (using trilinear
interpolation), spatial smoothing (using a 4 mm Gaussian kernel), linear trend removal,
and temporal high-pass filtering (using BrainVoyager default settings). Subjects were
eliminated if motion correction indicated deviations in the estimated center of mass
greater than 3 mm, leading to the elimination of 6 subjects. Functional data was then
co-registered to T1 anatomical images to create 4d data (anatomical 3D + time course)
for GLM analysis, using BrainVoyagers default settings.
For statistical analysis, we computed a general linear model on the percentage BOLD
signal normalized time course of 94 subjects. Our model contained one predictor for
the onset of payoff-relevant trials (RRelevant), one predictor for the onset of payoff-
neutral trials (RNeutral), and one predictor each for the feedback period of gain (FB+),
loss (FB−) and control (FB0) trials. Each of these five predictors was specified as
a zero-one variable (box-car), 2 seconds in duration when equal to one, which was
further convolved with a double gamma function estimate of the hemodynamic response,
using BrainVoyager default settings. The 2s predictors indicating feedback covered the
time period during which subjects saw the computer generated number as well as the
arrows/rectangle. Because the maximum time taken by subjects to enter their guesses
was just less than 2 seconds, we set the predictor indicating onset of payoff relevant
and payoff neutral trials to cover exactly 2 seconds from trial onset, thus increasing
comparability of our predictors by having them all be of equal length. The GLM for
our analysis was therefore:
BOLD = a+ b×RRelevant + c×RNeutral + d× FB+ + e× FB− + f × FB0 + error
Regions of interest were identified according to t-tests performed on the whole brain
contrast FB+ − FB− . A Bonferroni corrected p-value threshold of .01 was used as
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a cut-off for identifying significant clusters. Table 3.1 lists all clusters with significant
activation for this contrast.
We extracted regression weights for the above GLM separately for each subject to
correlate with IQ scores. Subject-specific regression weights were obtained by perform-
ing the above GLM on voxels falling into an anatomical template of the caudate nucleus.
Coordinates for the template are listed in Table 3.1. Importantly, we performed indi-
vidual differences analysis on regressors obtained from performing our GLM on this a
priori anatomically defined region of interest (ROI), rather than from the functionally
identified region showing the strongest contrast between gain and loss feedback. This
choice was made because regions that are most relevant for individual differences are
often not the same as those showing the strongest main contrast, precisely because in-
dividual differences reduce the strength of the main effect. However, the anatomical
region we used falls entirely into the functionally identified regions listed in Table 3.1.
Furthermore, all analysis reported here produce results that are statistically significant
at p ¡ .05 also when functionally identified ROIs are used.
We performed exploratory analysis on 3 selected functionally identified ROIs which
showed significant activation for gains compared to losses. These regions comprised the
medial prefrontal cortex (0, 44, 1) and posterior cingulate cortex- two regions shown to
correlate with the subjective utility of monetary outcomes of risky choices (Wu, Delgado,
& Maloney, 2011), and also the right inferior/middle frontal gyrus (-42, 44, 9), which
has been associated with neural representations of loss aversion (Tom, Fox, Trepel &
Poldrack, 2007).
Total brain size was calculated in Freesurfer using the asegstats2table command in
its default settings (Fischl & Dale, 2000).
Regressions in Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 were performed using the statistical pro-
gramming software R, and the general linear modeling package lme4 (Bates, Maechler
& Bolker, 2012). Regressions of behavioral data were computed using mixed effects
linear logistic regression; coefficients were conditioned at the subject level where ap-
propriate (Tables 1 and 2). The regression reported in Table 3.2 was performed using
robust regression to control for potential influence of outliers. Robust regression, ordi-
nary least square regression, and removal of potential outliers all produced results with
a statistically significant main effect of IQ as reported in the results section.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Brain Imaging Results
Averaged across all subjects, ignoring effects of IQ, neuroimaging results for our large
sample replicate and extend findings reported by Delgado et al (2000) on a sample of
9 subjects: We find anticipatory increases in BOLD response in the caudate at the
onset of reward relevant trials. This BOLD response remains elevated after revelation
of a gain, or decreases steeply below baseline in the case of losses. Figure 3.2 shows
this pattern of BOLD response for the masked caudate area (barycenter at (12, 9, 0),
Talairach).
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Figure 3.2: BOLD response FB+ > FB− (Gain > Loss) in the bilateral caudate.
BOLD response in caudate after gains is significantly higher than after losses. This results holds
for whole-brain analysis as well as a masked regression on the anatomically defined caudate (top
left). Event related average BOLD response in caudate replicates the time course identified
by Delgado et al. (2000) (top right). Additional areas showing significantly higher activation
after gains compared to losses in whole brain analysis include the medial prefrontal cortex and
posterior cingulate cortex (bottom panels).
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We obtained predictors of percentage BOLD change following rewarding (FB+) and
punishing (FB−) feedback by applying the event-related general linear model described
in the methods section. The brain regions showing significantly more activation after
gains than after losses are shown in Figure 3.2 and listed in Table 3.1. No brain areas
showed significantly larger activation after losses compared to gains. We focused our
investigation of the role of intelligence during feedback processing on the caudate (12,
9, 0) and the medial prefrontal cortex (0, 44, 1), because of their joint implication for
reward/punishment processing, reinforcement learning and decision making in previous
studies with similar task design (e.g. Delgado, Nystrom & Fissel, 2000., Li & Daw,
2011, Van denBos, Cohen, Kahnt & Crone, 2012). Use of a priori defined regions of
interest (ROI) for the investigation of individual differences is preferable to investiga-
tion of ROIs showing the greatest gain/loss contrast, because important influences of
individual differences may often imply small main (i.e. group average) effects. Alterna-
tively, identifying ROIs based on the identified presence of individual difference effects
is undesirable for well-documented reasons (Vul, Harris, Winkielman & Pashlert, 2009).
We extracted, individually for each subject, the regression coefficients for BOLD re-
sponses after gains, losses, and control sequences for our regions of interest. The panels
of Figure 3.3 illustrate correlations of the gain and loss responses with intelligence in
the Caudate.
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Figure 3.3: Individual subject GLM regressors and intelligence. The box plot
shows distribution of regression coefficients for Gain, Loss and Control trials extracted from
the anatomically defined caudate head ROI. Scatter plots and regression lines depict the rela-
tion between IQ and contrasted GLM estimates of BOLD response to feedback for the same
region. Potential outliers in the boxplot are depicted as black dots in the scatter plots. Statisti-
cal results are unaffected by the removal of these potential outliers. The correlation coefficients
between IQ and the contrasts depicted in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th panel of the figure are r = .24
(p = .02), r = 0.01 (p = .93), and r = -.24, (p = .02) respectively.
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Notably, the correlation between increasing intelligence and neural responses to out-
comes is significant and positive for losses (βreg = 0.31, p = .028), but essentially flat for
gains (βreg = -0.01, p = .952). This finding is more strikingly illustrated by the contrast
between gain and loss responses, which decreases significantly with higher intelligence
scores (βreg = -0.31, p = .014), indicating smaller decline of BOLD response after losses
for higher IQ. Table 3.2 shows the effect of intelligence on the neural responses to losses
when controlling for working memory and brain size using robust methods to attenuate
possible influences of potential outliers. Using robust regression (as done for the results
in Table 3.2), or conservatively removing potential outliers identified in the boxplot
of Figure 3.3 does not meaningfully affect the regression in Table 3.2 and retains the
statistically significant effect of IQ.
We performed the same analysis on BOLD responses after gains and losses for the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (0, 44, 1), and in a more exploratory fashion- on
the posterior cingulate cortex (pCC) (-1,-32,-28) and left inferior/middle frontal gyrus
(lMFG) (-42, 44, 9). mPFC and PCC are believed to show BOLD signal activation in
proportion to the experienced utility from outcomes of risky choices (Wu, Delgado &
Maloney, 2011), and activation in the lMFG has been associated with behavioral loss
aversion (Tom, Fox, Trepel & Poldrack, 2007). The conjecture that the relation between
subjects risk preferences and intelligence is shaped by the experience of outcomes to risky
choices implies a relation between intelligence and responses to gains compared to losses
(i.e. the contrast Win Loss) in brain regions whose activation correlates with subjective
utility, hence investigation of these regions was also of importance to our study: We
find a correlation between intelligence and the contrast of gain and loss responses in the
mPFC: r = -.208, p = .045, and in the lMFG (r =-.246, p = .017). No correlation was
found for the posterior cingulate cortex (r = -.111, p = .286).
The above findings provide strong evidence for a link between intelligence and ex-
post processing, or experience, of monetary losses. Given the prominent roles of the
caudate and the medial prefrontal cortex during reinforcement learning, and our tasks
conceptual identity with standard reinforcement learning tasks, our results provide the
necessary basis for investigating the hypothesis that outcomes of probabilistic events
have differential impact on negative and positive reinforcement signals for subjects who
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differ in IQ. Support for this hypothesis would signify an important step towards explain-
ing – at the level of theoretical neuroscience– how individual differences in intelligence
relate to long-term differences in attitudes to risk: The implied mechanism of this hy-
pothesis states that a functional role of intelligence during reinforcement systematically
leads to divergent experiences of punishment during probabilistic decision making, with
higher intelligence correlating with reduced (i.e. less negative) prediction errors after
negative outcomes. One probable functional account of how the above described mod-
erating effect of IQ may arise during reinforcement, may be due to an effect of IQ on
the complexity of the mental model a subject applies to a feedback learning task. We
explore this possibility in relation to the behavioral data of our task.
3.3.2 Behavioral Results
Mixed-effects logistic panel regression (Table 3.3), grouped by subject, shows that sub-
jects’ guesses in any given trial were influenced primarily by the computer choice ob-
served in the most recent two trials, with subjects more often choosing the option not
recently selected by the computer. The outcome (i.e. gain or loss) of the previous trials
did not exhibit a significant effect on subjects’ choices. Thus, we do not find evidence
of a pervasive use of a win-stay/lose-shift heuristic. Response times did not substan-
tially differ with respect to subject IQ (r = -.14, p = .16). Additionally, the observed
overall frequency of High choices by the computer does not influence subjects’ behavior
after controlling for the computer’s choice one and two trials back (Table 3.3, column
3), indicating that subjects modified their choices with respect to past observations of
computer behavior in a manner that extends beyond responding to simple frequency.
Stated more affirmatively, subjects appeared engaged, consciously or unconsciously, in
an attempt to learn and exploit perceived patterns in the reward generating process by
modeling recently observed computer choices. Our subsequent analysis shows that this
behavioral process is systematically moderated by intelligence.
To aid interpretation of our results we consider a decision and feedback-learning pro-
cess during which more intelligent subjects construct richer and more complex mental
models of the computer’s choice generating process. Such a process could be formally
expressed within the framework of standard model-based reinforcement-learning (Li et
al., 2011; Liljeholm & ODoherty, 2012; Daw et al., 2011; den Ouden, Friston, Daw,
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McIntosh, & Stephan, 2009; Glscher, Daw, Dayan, & ODoherty, 2010), during which
decision-makers up-date their beliefs regarding state-transitions and state-action reward
values via prediction error assessment. State-action rewards describe the value of reward
that is associated with taking a particular action in a particular state. State transitions
describe the probability with which states succeed one another. In our task state-action
reward values are deterministically fixed and known to each subject, while state tran-
sitions (i.e. whether the computer generated number will be high or low) are unknown
and have to be learned. Consequentially, the prediction error a subject experiences in
our task depends solely on the subject’s beliefs regarding the process that determines
the computer generated number, and how he estimates this process from the feedback
in the task.
Given the described behavioral findings, we operationalize the idea that subjects
with higher IQ use richer mental reinforcement models as the hypothesis that more
intelligent subjects integrate a longer history of past observations into their estima-
tion and belief-updating procedure. To investigate this claim, we first considered the
observed trial-by-trial frequencies of observed computer choices for each subject. In
particular we considered three frequencies: F 0t , the unconditional frequency of observed
computer choices at trial t, F 1t the frequency of observed computer choices up to trial t
conditional on the computers choice in the previous trial, and F 2t , the computer choices
conditional on the computers choices two trials back1 . Based on each of these frequen-
cies, we calculated the trial-by-trial expected value of guessing High for each subject and
entered these values into a mixed-effects logistic panel regression, grouped by subject,
in order to assess the impact of these conditional frequencies on subject choice (Table
3.4). As already demonstrated by the results in Table 3.3, expected values based on the
unconditional frequency of computer choices, EV 0, were unrelated to subject choices.
However, expected values based on conditional frequencies relating to one and two trials
back, EV 1 and EV 2 respectively, significantly affected subjects guessing behavior. For
subjects at the lower range of intelligence for our sample, conditional frequencies one
trial back positively predicted guessing behavior, whereas subjects in the higher range
of intelligence displayed an increasing effect of the events two trials back (Note that, in
our sample, lower IQ individuals have an average level of IQ with respect to the overall
1 Considering no more than two previous trials is justified in light of our analysis described above.
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population.).
Because our experiment was not designed to differentiate between competing possi-
ble models of how subjects use past information to determine future choices, our analysis
remains restricted to showing that intelligence predicts the extent to which information
further back in time predicts subjects behavior. To illustrate this clearly without as-
suming any specific functional form for information integration, Table 3.5 combines
information from one period and two periods back into a single regressor EV 1+2 , con-
sisting of the un-weighted average of F 1t and F
2
t . In this analysis, controlling for F
1
t does
not eliminate the hypothesized effect that the influence of the composite information
on subjects guesses significantly increases with IQ. Hence, we find that subjects with
higher IQs were influenced by events one and two periods back, whereas subjects with
lower IQs were chiefly responding to events only one period back.
At this point it is important to point out that by considering more information in
our task, high IQ subjects are likely to more quickly learn the true structure of the
process assigning rewards, despite the fact that rewards are not actually contingent on
previous trial outcomes in the experiment. For an easy intuition of why this is the case,
one may consider the simple case in which subjects formulate reward expectancies by
averaging reward experiences over histories of observations that differ in length. In this
environment higher IQ subjects who consider longer histories will make estimates that
are on average closer to the true mean reward value (zero in our task) than will subjects
with lower IQ, whose trial-by-trial estimates will on average exhibit larger deviations
from the true mean (in particular, under the proposition that subjects will choose the
action that maximizes expected reward, this deviation will lead to an overestimate of
the expected reward for each trial). This arithmetic relationbetween belief updating
based on differentially rich histories of past observations and the expected precision
of reward predictions according to such beliefsmay provide the basis for the already
described differences in neural responses after losses: If loss responses in the caudate are
interpreted as prediction errors, then subjects with higher IQ - whose predictions more
closely resemble equal probability for each outcome - would experience smaller prediction
errors after losses, a consequence of formulating beliefs with regards to richer histories
of past observations. However, this interpretation should be viewed as an exploratory
account of a possible mechanism underlying the more strongly supported neural evidence
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reported in this manuscript, and will require further research for substantiation.
3.4 Discussion
By providing neural and behavioral support for a functional role of intelligence during
gain and loss processing, the results reported here bring us closer to understanding
how intelligence may influence preferences over uncertain outcomes. Our main result
demonstrates that IQ moderates BOLD responses to losses. This finding, in combination
with our behavioral results seems compatible with the hypothesis that more intelligent
subjects evaluate random rewards and punishments using mental models of greater
complexity, and that this influence of IQ manifests as differences in the experienced
reinforcement-relevant prediction errors when outcomes are revealed. It is clear that
the precise mechanics of this account will need further investigation and description
within a formal model.
Our findings relate directly to previously identified correlations of decision behavior
with increasing intelligence, in particular increased willingness to take risks and reduced
temporal discounting. Our results offer the possibility that these joint correlations
might be founded in systematic differences in the way rewards and punishments are
experienced ex-post by decision makers with different cognitive ability. This effect
of intelligence would be in addition to, but distinct from, its role during the ex-ante
evaluation of decision options.
Extending the results of our behavioral analysis, our results recommend investigating
the functional role of IQ during reinforcement learning, with respect to the hypothesis
that higher intelligence correlates with the ability to maintain richer mental models of
feedback contingencies, one result of which may be generally reduced negative prediction
errors after probabilistic events, and consequently reduced aversion to potential risks.
Current research in theoretical neuroscience demonstrates that the predictive power of
reinforcement learning algorithms applied to human behavior and neural activity can
be improved by considering the effect that experimentally induced increases in cognitive
load or limitations in working memory have on a decision-makers consideration of state-
transitions and success in learning action-outcome relations (Otto, Gersham, Markman,
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& Daw, 2012; Collins & Frank, 2012). Hence, our results add to an emerging litera-
ture suggesting the potential of improving reinforcement learning models in theoretical
neuroscience by considering the impact of stable individual differences in cognitive abil-
ity on feedback learning (van den Bos, Cohen, Kahnt & Crone, 2012; Otto, Gersham,
Markman, & Daw, 2012; Collins & Frank, 2012). Our results for medial prefrontal
cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus further suggest that investigation into the relation
between intelligence and experienced utility may benefit particularly from analyzing the
functional integration of utility coding prefrontal areas with subcortical regions during
reinforcement learning2 .
Despite explicit references to reinforcement mechanisms in this manuscript, our main
conclusions do not depend on this particular mechanistic interpretation of our results,
and instead may remain focused on the positive finding that intelligence moderates
responses to monetary losses. This finding, by itself, demonstrates that previously
observed decision-correlates of intelligence may stem from differences in how options are
perceived and outcomes experienced, rather than following exclusively from differences
in the acuity with which options are computationally compared during the process of
making decisions. This possibility had not been previously demonstrated.
Finally, in a separate view, our results provide the neurophysiological basis for a
potential bridge between theoretical neuroscience and psychological research on intel-
ligence: Although it has been shown that general intelligence is predicted by subjects’
efficiency during associative learning (Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, & Brown, 2009), the
mechanism via which associative learning contributes to general intelligence has re-
mained essentially unexplored. Further investigation of a moderating effect of IQ on
model complexity may contribute toward providing a functional, neurophysiological,
account of how IQ influences associative learning.
2 Notably, a link between developmental changes in reinforcement learning and striatal-medial
prefrontal cortex connectivity has been identified in at least one previous study (van den Bos, Cohen,
Kahnt, & Crone, 2012). Additionally, neural responses in medial orbitofrontal cortex and dorsomedial
striatum have been shown to co-vary as a function of causal contingency (Tanaka, Balleine, & ODoherty,
2008).
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Table 3.1: Regions of interest differentiating between Gain and Loss feed-
back:
ROI (FB+ > FB−) Peak X Peak Y Peak Z Nr. of Voxels Avg. t-stat. Avg. p-value
Medial prefrontal G. (mPFC) 1 49 3 4160 7.98 <.001
Posterior Cingulate C. (pCC) -1 -32 28 9,15 <.001
Right Caudate -1 6 -3 2873 9,91 <.001
Left Caudate 13 3 -5 2740 11.33 <.001
Parahippocampal G. 17 -15 -16 4227 7.15 <.001
Left medial Frontal G.(lmFC) -42 44 9 1050 6.50 <.001
Anatomically defined Caudate 8 7 -4 5613 6.86 <.001
Table 3.2: Impact of IQ on BOLD signal after losses. Note: The contrast between
neural loss and win responses correlates significantly with intelligence. Controlling for
working memory and age does not affect the independent effect of intelligence. Loss
responses are negative (significant negative intercept term) and higher IQ shifts loss
responses closer to zero, i.e. prediction errors after losses decrease with increasing IQ.
Results from a robust regression (*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(b/se) (b/se) (b/se)
Dependent variable: Caudate BOLD FB− > FB0
Intercept -4.26 *** -5.25 *** -7.69 **
(1.5) (2.05) (2.3)
IQ 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.03 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Head Size (mm3) 0.004 0.009
(0.14) (0.14)
Working Memory (dprime) 0.12 0.21
(0.15) (0.16)
Adj-R2 .06 .05 .08
p-value .03 .07 .03
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Table 3.3: Influence of past computer choices on subject choices. Note: Mixed
effects logistic panel regression, grouped by subject. N = 3478. HCPU i-back is a
dummy variable, representing whether the computer chose High i periods back. Freq
Hcpu is the historic frequency of High choices by the computer, expressed as deviance
from 0.5. (*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion,
LL: Log Likelihood)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(b/se) (b/se) (b/se)
Dependent variable: Subject’s choice of H
Intercept 0.091 . 0.453 *** 0.368 ***
(0.051) (0.084) (0.07)
Freq. of HCPU -1.136 *** -0.091 -0.23
(0.333) (0.374) (0.360)
HCPU 1-back -0.210 *** -0.273 **
(0.073) (0.087)
HCPU 2-back -0.44 *** -0.373 ***
(0.073) (0.086)
HCPU 3-back -0.110
(0.073)
HCPU 1-back × Won -0.168 .
(0.10)
HCPU 1-back × Lost -0.12
(0.09)
BIC 4802 4784 4790
LL -2389 -2368 -2367
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Table 3.4: Influence of conditional transition probabilities on subject behav-
ior. Note: Mixed effects logistic panel regression, grouped by subject. N = 3478. HCPU
i-back is a dummy variable, representing whether the computer chose High i periods
back. Freq HCPU is the historic frequency of High choices by the computer, expressed
as deviance from 0.5. (*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, BIC: Bayesian Information
Criterion, LL: Log Likelihood)
Model 1 Model 2
(b/se) (b/se)
Dependent variable: Subject’s choice of H
Intercept 0.102 . 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
EV m0(H) -1.039
(2.36)
EV m1(H) 2.66 * 2.45 *
(1.22) (1.06)
EV m2(H) -1.87 * 2.00 *
(1.00) (0.93)
EV m0(H)× IQ 0.001
(0.02)
EV m1(H)× IQ -0.02 * -0.02 *
(0.01) (0.01)
EV m2(H)× IQ 0.02 * 0.02 *
(0.01) (0.01)
BIC 4828 4828
LL -2382 -2389
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Table 3.5: Relation of IQ to conditional probabilities influencing choice be-
havior. Note: Mixed effects logistic panel regression, grouped by subject. N = 3478.
HCPU i-back is a dummy variable, representing whether the computer chose High i
periods back. Freq HCPU is the historic frequency of High choices by the computer,
expressed as deviance from 0.5. (*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, BIC: Bayesian
Information Criterion, LL: Log Likelihood)
Model 1
(b/se)
Dependent variable: Subject’s choice of H
Intercept 0.066
(0.05)
EV m1(H) 4.45 **
(1.59)
EV m1+2(H) -4.00 *
(1.59)
EV m1(H)× IQ -0.04 **
(0.01)
EV m1+2(H)× IQ 0.03 *
(0.015)
BIC 4828
LL -2389
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
The first study in this dissertation identifies a role of experience-based reinforcement
signals for abstract reasoning during complex strategic choice, and discusses implica-
tions for strategic learning in general. The study also identifies behavioral correlates
of strategically allocated cognitive effort during the decision task: Subjects adjust the
time spent reasoning about which choice to make, in relation to the expected return
of increased reasoning. Hence, the study also hints at an underlying principally eco-
nomic1 process during which cognitive effort is allocated as a scarce resource during
decision-making. This aspect of the first study links it firmly to the second study during
which a link between intelligence (in economic terms a measure of intrinsic individual
differences in the ability to allocate cognitive resources) and differences in reinforcement
signals after gains and losses is established.
The findings of the second study were considered as a possible mechanism underlying
simultaneous correlations between intelligence and risk attitudes and intelligence and
attitudes to temporal delay.
Since each study includes its own discussion section, the overall conclusion to this
dissertation is used more as an opportunity to extrapolate more speculatively from the
findings presented here to one possible further direction of this research for which the
neuroeconomic approach might seem especially relevant: Both studies identify a role for
cognitive ability during decision-making. Taken together they seem to suggest that the
1 Principally economic, because it deals with the allocation of a scarce resource within the framework
of maximizing a decision objective.
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process via which people allocate cognitive resources during decision-making is
a) principally economic in nature,
b) can impact immediate decision and learning trajectories, and
c) may underlie long-term preferences and decision tendencies.
Understanding and explicitly modeling decisions as emerging from a trade-off be-
tween costly cognitive effort and the anticipated resulting improvement of decision out-
comes seems a critical future direction for cognitive neuroscience as well as psychology.
Neuroeconomics, because of its intellectual history in economics, appears particularly
suited for advancing this line of research. For one, onbserved cognitive performance,
is not solely determined by cognitive ability. Instead, the decision-maker’s incentives
for improving performance given a particular cognitive strategy, and/or for identifying
superior cognitive strategies (possibly in an attempt to reduce long-term cognitive ef-
fort) co-determine behavioral outcomes. The relation betwen experimentally observed
cognitive effort and underlying cogntive ability (and individual differences in general)
is therefore one of equilibrium, and one which can benefit from the type of modeling
that is historically associated with economics; especially modeling aimed at overcoming
identification problems when linking observed outcomes to latent traits. (Borghans,
Golsteyn, Heckman & Humphries, 2011; Heckman, Stixrud & Urzua, 2006). This re-
search tradition may be carried over by Neuroeconomics into current investigations of
the brain and how we make decisions.
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